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In a recent Yale Law Journal article, Linda Greenhouse and Reva 
Siegel question the received wisdom that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Roe v. Wade generated a political backlash, inflaming conflict over 
abortion and damaging the political process.1  The authors do not deny 
that Roe has served as a lightning rod in the culture wars.2  The evidence 
they highlight, though, shows that political conflict over abortion 
predated the Roe opinion, spurred by the Catholic Church and by 
Republican Party strategists seeking to foster party realignment.3  This 
enriched picture of the political and social landscape at the time of the 
decision undermines any simplistic suggestion that Roe served as “the 
sole cause of backlash”4 or “single-handedly caused societal polarization 
and party realignment around the question of abortion.”5 
At the same time, not all critiques of Roe based on its consequences 
for our shared political life are grounded in a simple belief that Roe 
“began conflict over abortion.”6  Greenhouse and Siegel make no 
mention of perhaps the most famous articulation of the backlash thesis, 
offered by Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who argued 
that “[a] less encompassing Roe, one that merely struck down the 
extreme Texas law and went no further on that day . . . might have 
served to reduce rather than to fuel controversy.”7  Justice Ginsburg 
recognized that conflict over abortion predated Roe, but saw the Court’s 
 
* Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia 
School of Law.  I am grateful to Katie Croghan for helpful research assistance. 
1. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions 
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2030–31 (2011). 
2. Greenhouse and Siegel acknowledge that “Roe has become nearly synonymous with 
political conflict,” and that “‘Roe’ is now a shorthand reference for positions staked out in 
long-running debates over gender, religion, and politics.”  Id. at 2030, 2033. 
3. Id. at 2046–47. 
4. Id. at 2081. 
5. Id. at 2073. 
6. Id. at 2072. 
7. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199 
(1992). 
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opinion as pouring fuel on the fire.8  Her position seems immune to the 
authors’ criticism that the backlash narrative discourages vindication of 
rights through the courts or counsels avoidance of adjudication.9  Justice 
Ginsburg embraced the Roe litigation and the invalidation of the Texas 
statute by the Court, criticizing only the breadth of the opinion, which 
constitutionalized abortion rights far broader than necessary to 
invalidate either the Texas statute in Roe10 or the Georgia statute at 
issue in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton.11 
As Greenhouse and Siegel emphasize, “facts matter in any 
conversation about Roe as an exemplar of the possibilities and limits of 
judicial review.”12  Careful evaluation of the Court’s handiwork in Roe 
requires a sophisticated understanding of forces contributing to the 
abortion conflict, an understanding the authors advance through their 
research.13  But such an evaluation also demands a sophisticated 
understanding of the Roe decision itself.  The authors tell us much about 
events prior to the Court’s decision in Roe, but they say very little about 
the choices the Justices made in writing the opinion, choices that 
hampered any stable political resolution of the abortion issue. 
Supreme Court files from Roe and Doe show that Justice Blackmun 
circulated successive draft opinions staking out three distinct and 
increasingly expansive positions on the constitutional right to abortion.14  
The Court ultimately gravitated to the most far-reaching of these 
formulations, recognizing a right to abortion for any reason until the 
fetus becomes viable (i.e., able to live outside the womb).15  This viability 
rule extended constitutional abortion rights through the second 
trimester of pregnancy, give or take a few weeks.16  The Court staked 
 
8. Id. at 1208. 
9. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2086. 
10. Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester 
Framework, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 507–08 (2011) (citing and quoting Ginsburg, supra 
note 7, at 1199). 
11. See 410 U.S. 179, 201–02 (1973). 
12. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2033. 
13. See id. at 2086. 
14. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 550–51, 580–81, 585–86 (1994); Beck, supra note 10, at 515–26 
(detailing the development of Justice Blackmun’s successive draft opinions). 
15. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–65 (1973). 
16. See id.; Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2031–32.  At Justice Powell’s 
suggestion, the Roe majority “extended constitutional protection from the first to the second 
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out this sweeping constitutional entitlement even though Justices in the 
majority recognized that resolution of Roe and Doe did not require an 
opinion on the duration of abortion rights, an issue neither briefed nor 
argued by the parties.17  The Court’s unnecessary, unexplained, and 
almost casual adoption of the viability rule created a regime of abortion 
rights offering far less potential protection for fetal life than most other 
countries of the world.18 
The Court’s adoption of the viability rule in Roe did not initiate 
political conflict over abortion, but it did channel and exacerbate the 
nascent conflict in ways that make a stable resolution difficult to attain.  
By greatly restricting the range of permissible legislative action, the 
viability rule disabled legislative bodies from negotiating political 
compromises like those worked out in other countries.  At the same 
time, the decision facilitated pro-life mobilization, putting abortion 
rights advocates in the position of defending methods of abortion 
“susceptible to gruesome description,” as Justice Ginsburg once rather 
delicately framed the matter.19  While the political system might have 
adjusted to a more limited constitutional right, Roe’s extension of 
abortion rights through the second trimester of pregnancy created a 
structural misalignment between constitutional law and popular 
sentiment, evidenced by significant majorities affirming that second 
trimester abortions should be presumptively illegal.20  Absent a fairly 
seismic shift in public opinion about late-term abortions—something 
that has not occurred in the nearly four decades since Roe—the viability 
rule made it impossible to enact abortion laws even roughly 
 
trimester of pregnancy, until the point of fetal viability.”  Greenhouse & Siegel, supra, at 
2031–32. 
17. Beck, supra note 10, at 511–12, 516. 
18. Randy Beck, Essay, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249, 
261–65 (2009) (comparing the United States’ abortion rights regime to that of other countries 
and explaining that “by allowing abortion for any reason until viability, the Court has pushed 
U.S. abortion law far outside the international mainstream”). 
19. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that 
“the most common method of performing previability second trimester abortions [(the 
D&E)] is no less distressing or susceptible to gruesome description” than the D&X method at 
issue in the case).  Justice Stevens provided a similar abortion-method comparison in his 
concurrence, finding no reason to think D&X abortion “is more brutal, more gruesome, or 
less respectful of ‘potential life’ than the equally gruesome [D&E] procedure Nebraska claims 
it still allows.”  See id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
20. See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
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approximating the views of a majority of Americans.  The result has 
been an intractable battle over abortion, centered on the future of the 
Court. 
I. 
Counsel in Roe and Doe initially argued their cases to a seven-
member Supreme Court, with two seats unfilled.21  The task of writing 
opinions was assigned to Justice Blackmun, the Court’s newest 
member.22  Justice Blackmun’s first draft of an opinion in Roe would 
have invalidated the Texas statute on vagueness grounds, rather than on 
the basis of a constitutional right to abortion.23  The first draft of Doe 
recognized a constitutional right to abortion, but expressed no opinion 
as to when in pregnancy a state would have a compelling interest in 
regulating to protect fetal life.24  Five Justices (Blackmun, Douglas, 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart) signed onto these opinions, striking 
down the Texas statute as vague and the Georgia statute as violating an 
abortion right of unspecified duration.25  Notwithstanding an 
insurmountable majority in favor of a constitutional right to abortion, 
however, the Court accepted Justice Blackmun’s suggestion to rehear 
Roe and Doe after Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the bench.26 
Following reargument, the second draft of Roe emerged as the lead 
opinion recognizing a right to abortion, implementing a suggestion made 
by Justice Powell.27  This time, Justice Blackmun specified the temporal 
 
21. GARROW, supra note 14, at 524. 
22. Id. at 473–74, 532–33 (providing background on the appointment of Justice 
Blackmun to replace Justice Abe Fortas and explaining how Justice Blackmun was assigned 
the Roe and Doe opinions). 
23. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, First Draft Opinion in Roe v. Wade 15 (May 18, 1972) 
[hereinafter Roe First Draft] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of 
Congress, Box 151, Folder 4); Beck, supra note 10, at 517. 
24. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, First Draft Opinion in Doe v. Bolton 9–11 (May 25, 
1972) [hereinafter Doe First Draft] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of 
Congress, Box 152, Folder 7); Beck, supra note 10, at 517–18. 
25. Beck, supra note 10, at 518. 
26. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference, Re: No. 70-18—
Roe v. Wade, No. 70-40—Doe v. Bolton 1 (May 31, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun 
Memorandum to the Conference, May 31, 1972] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, 
Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 3); Beck, supra note 10, at 518. 
27. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Second Draft Opinion in Roe v. Wade 37–49 (Nov. 22, 
1972) [hereinafter Roe Second Draft] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 151, 
Folder 6); Beck, supra note 10, at 520 (noting the second draft’s consistency with Justice 
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scope of the right, indicating that the state interest in protecting fetal life 
becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester of pregnancy.28  He 
explained this alteration in a cover memorandum accompanying the 
draft: 
 
In its present form [the opinion] contains dictum, but I suspect 
that in this area some dictum is indicated and not to be avoided. 
 You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the 
first trimester is critical.  This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other 
selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally 
arbitrary.29 
 
Less than three weeks later, again due to a suggestion from Justice 
Powell, Justice Blackmun sought input from his colleagues as to whether 
the Court should select the first trimester or viability as the controlling 
line, a decision affecting “the interval from approximately 12 weeks to 
about 28 weeks.”30  With only Justice Douglas expressing a preference to 
retain the first-trimester cutoff, and some other Justices favoring a later 
point in pregnancy, Justice Blackmun’s third draft of Roe shifted to the 
viability rule found in the published opinion.31 
Nothing in Roe or Doe required the Court to address the duration of 
 
Powell’s suggestion). 
28. Roe Second Draft, supra note 27, at 47.  Justice Blackmun wrote as follows:  
 
We repeat that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in the 
potentiality of human life and that this interest grows in strength as the woman 
approaches term.  At some point this interest becomes ‘compelling.’  We fix 
that point at, or any time after, the end of the first trimester, as the State may 
determine. 
Id. 
29. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference, Re: No. 70-18—
Roe v. Wade 1 (Nov. 21, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Nov. 
21, 1972] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 
6). 
30. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference, Re: Abortion 
Cases 1 (Dec. 11, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Dec. 11, 
1972] (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 4); 
Beck, supra note 10, at 523. 
31. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Third Draft Opinion in Roe v. Wade 48–49 (Dec. 21, 
1972) (on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 6); 
Beck, supra note 10, at 524–25. 
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abortion rights in order to strike down either the Texas or Georgia 
statutes, a point made by a variety of individuals in internal Supreme 
Court correspondence.  Prior to circulation of the initial draft opinions, 
for instance, Justice Brennan wrote privately to Justice Douglas:  
 
I would deny any such [compelling State] interest in the life of 
the fetus in the early stages of pregnancy.  On the other hand, I 
would leave open the question of when life ‘is actually present’—
whether there is some point in the term before birth at which the 
interest in the life of the fetus does become subordinating.32  
 
The first draft of the Doe opinion pursued an approach similar to that 
privately endorsed by Justice Brennan, stating, “Except to note that the 
State’s interest grows stronger as the woman approaches term, we need 
not delineate that interest with greater detail in order to recognize that 
it is a ‘compelling’ state interest.”33  After Justice Blackmun 
incorporated a first-trimester cutoff in the second draft of Roe, one of 
Justice Powell’s law clerks noted that “[s]ince the statutory prohibition 
[in Texas] was total,” it was “unnecessary to the result that we draw the 
line.”34  Justice Powell then made the same point to Justice Blackmun: 
inquiring whether viability might serve as a better line than the first 
trimester “if we conclude to designate a particular point of time,” he 
acknowledged that “[o]f course, it is not essential that we express an 
opinion as to such a date.”35 
Since it was unnecessary for the Court to address the duration of 
abortion rights in Roe and Doe, Justices in the majority understood that 
language on this issue appearing in the opinions would constitute 
dictum.  In his memorandum suggesting that the abortion cases be 
reargued, Justice Blackmun asked whether the Court should go further 
 
32. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Re: Abortion Cases 9 (Dec. 30, 
1971) (on file with the William J. Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box I:285, Folder 9); 
Beck, supra note 10, at 516–17. 
33. Doe First Draft, supra note 24, at 11.  The referenced copy of this opinion from 
Justice Blackmun’s files includes the word “perhaps” written by hand before the phrase 
“grows stronger as the woman approaches term.”  See id. 
34. See David J. Garrow, Revelations on the Road to Roe, AM. LAW., May 2000, at 80, 
82; Beck, supra note 10, at 521. 
35. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice Harry Blackmun, Re: Abortion 
Cases 1–2 (Nov. 29, 1972); Beck, supra note 10, at 522. 
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than it had in the initial drafts: “Should we spell out—although it would 
then necessarily be largely dictum—just what aspects are controllable by 
the State and to what extent?”36  As already noted, the cover 
memorandum accompanying the second draft of Roe acknowledged the 
inclusion of dictum in the opinion and then immediately called attention 
to the adoption of a first-trimester cutoff point.37  A few weeks later, 
Justice Stewart commented on this second draft: 
 
One of my concerns with your opinion as presently written is the 
specificity of its dictum—particularly in its fixing of the end of 
the first trimester as the critical point for valid state action.  I 
appreciate the inevitability and indeed wisdom of dicta in the 
Court’s opinion, but I wonder about the desirability of the dicta 
being quite so inflexibly “legislative.”38 
 
Justice Stewart made explicit what had been implied in Justice 
Blackmun’s cover memorandum, that the dicta incorporated in the 
second draft of Roe included the language specifying the duration of 
abortion rights. 
A number of scholars have noted that the opinion in Roe literally 
offered no justification for adopting the viability rule39—an omission the 
Court has yet to persuasively rectify.40  The Roe Court did venture a 
conclusory reference to “logical and biological justifications” for state 
regulation after viability, but made no effort to spell out those 
justifications or show their significance for constitutional purposes.41  
 
36. Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, May 31, 1972, supra note 26, at 2; Beck, 
supra note 10, at 518. 
37. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
38. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart, Re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 14, 1972) (on 
file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 8); Beck, supra 
note 10, at 525. 
39. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 18, at 267–70; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 96 & n.171 (1995); John Hart Ely, The 
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 (1973); Nancy K. 
Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639, 644, 664 
(1986); Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life 
and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1973). 
40. Beck, supra note 18, at 267, 271–79 (demonstrating the lack of “principled 
justification for the viability rule”). 
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).  John Hart Ely pinpointed the problem in his 
classic response to the Roe opinion: “Exactly why [viability] is the magic moment is not made 
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The Court’s internal deliberations on the duration of abortion rights 
likewise seem sparse given the importance of the interests at stake.  
After explaining his initial selection of the first-trimester cutoff, Justice 
Blackmun offered some thoughts about viability as a possible line: 
 
Viability, however, has its own strong points.  It has logical and 
biological justifications.  There is a practical aspect, too, for I am 
sure that there are many pregnant women, particularly younger 
girls, who may refuse to face the fact of pregnancy and who, for 
one reason or another, do not get around to medical consultation 
until the end of the first trimester is upon them or, indeed, has 
passed.42 
 
Justice Marshall echoed the latter point, expressing concern about 
“the difficulties which many women may have in believing that they are 
pregnant and in deciding to seek an abortion.”43  From the available 
records, this argument that some women have difficulty facing the fact 
of pregnancy appears to be the most explicit ground provided to the 
Court for favoring the viability rule over the first trimester.44  The 
 
clear  . . . .  [T]he Court’s defense seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism.”  Ely, supra 
note 39, at 924. 
42. Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Dec. 11, 1972, supra note 30, at 1; Beck, 
supra note 10, at 523. 
43. Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall, Re: Abortion Cases (Dec. 12, 1972) 
(on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 151, Folder 4) (“Given 
the difficulties which many women may have in believing that they are pregnant and in 
deciding to seek an abortion, I fear that the earlier date may not in practice serve the interests 
of those women, which your opinion does seek to serve.”).  Justice Powell made a similar 
point in a private memorandum to Justice Blackmun that apparently was never sent.  See 
Garrow, supra note 34, at 83 (“[T]he women who most need the benefit of liberalized 
abortion laws are likely to be young, inexperienced, unsure, frightened and perhaps 
unmarried.” (quoting Justice Powell)). 
44. Justice Blackmun’s memorandum also contended that “few could argue, or would 
argue, that a state’s interest by the time of viability, when independent life is presumably 
possible, is not sufficiently developed to justify appropriate regulation.”  See Blackmun 
Memorandum to the Conference, Dec. 11, 1972, supra note 30, at 1.  I have argued elsewhere 
that the assertion the fetus is “independent” of the mother at viability fails to provide a 
principled constitutional justification for the viability rule.  See Beck, supra note 18, at 273–76.  
Justice Powell’s private memorandum to Justice Blackmun inquiring about the possibility of 
changing the controlling line from the first trimester to viability also quoted dicta from Judge 
Newman’s opinion for the Second Circuit in Abele v. Markle to the effect that “the state 
interest in protecting the life of a fetus capable of living outside the uterus could be shown to 
be more generally accepted and, therefore, of more weight in the constitutional sense than 
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argument did not make its way into the published opinion in Roe. 
That some women remain unaware of pregnancy for a period of time 
does not provide a principled constitutional justification for the viability 
rule.  Justices Blackmun and Marshall presumably feared that some 
women would not learn of pregnancy until the end of the first trimester 
or beyond, potentially depriving them of the opportunity to obtain an 
abortion under a first-trimester cutoff.45  However, viability—the ability 
of the fetus to survive outside the womb—has no logical connection to a 
woman’s consciousness of pregnancy; many women are aware of 
pregnancy long before fetal viability, and there may be unusual cases 
where a woman with a viable fetus does not yet know she is pregnant.  
Just as Roe’s public defense of the viability rule “seem[ed] to mistake a 
definition for a syllogism,”46 the Court’s internal deliberations expose 
the viability rule as an enormous non sequitur.  Even if one believes the 
right to abortion should extend beyond the first trimester in a case 
where a woman remains unaware of pregnancy, this seems a remarkably 
weak rationale for the Court’s decision to expand constitutional 
abortion rights in all cases from “approximately 12 weeks” (the first 
trimester) “to about 28 weeks” (viability).47  The fact that some women 
have difficulty acknowledging a pregnancy provides no reason to deny 
state regulatory power throughout the second trimester with respect to 
those conscious of pregnancy from an early stage. 
The Court’s failure to identify an adequate ground for the viability 
rule, either in the opinion itself or in its internal deliberations, may be 
attributable to the posture of the litigation.  Since the duration of 
abortion rights was not at issue in Roe or Doe, the parties did not brief 
or argue the question, nor did they prepare a record designed to assist 
 
the interest in preventing the abortion of a fetus that is not viable.”  See Letter from Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Re: Abortion Cases, supra note 35, at 1 (quoting Abele v. Markle, 351 
F. Supp. 224, 232 (D. Conn. 1972)).  Justice Blackmun’s memorandum to the entire Court 
seeking input on the durational issue did not include this argument, but it did reference Judge 
Newman’s opinion.  See Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Dec. 11, 1972, supra 
note 30, at 2.  On the idea of “general acceptance” as a justification for the viability rule, see 
Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. REV. 713, 
732–34 (2007); see also infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (discussing polling data 
showing that a supermajority of Americans believe second trimester abortions should be 
presumptively illegal). 
45. See Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall, supra note 43. 
46. See Ely, supra note 39, at 924. 
47. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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the Court in addressing the durational problem.48  If the Court had 
waited for a case in which the duration of abortion rights actually 
affected the validity of a statute, the parties might have prepared a 
record specifically addressing matters such as when most women learn 
about pregnancy and what percentage remain unaware of their 
condition after the first trimester.49  The briefs could have debated the 
significance of such data for the validity of a particular statute, as well as 
other relevant questions the Justices failed to consider.  Instead, Justices 
Blackmun and Marshall were reduced to speculation about essentially 
empirical questions. 
Justice Blackmun confessed in connection with Roe’s second draft 
that he considered drawing the line at the first trimester “arbitrary,” but 
that drawing it at quickening or viability would perhaps be “equally 
arbitrary.”50  The Court’s unjustified decision to extend abortion rights 
to the point of viability seems difficult to square with the description of 
the Court’s role offered by the three-Justice plurality in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: “Consistent with 
other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear 
arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification.  But courts 
may not.  We must justify the lines we draw.”51  This account of proper 
adjudication appears, ironically enough, as part of the Casey plurality’s 
explanation for retaining Roe’s viability rule.52 
II. 
We typically resolve political disagreements in this country through 
democratic participation in electoral and legislative processes.  Citizens 
campaign and vote for candidates who represent their views and 
elected representatives then negotiate political compromises.  People 
dissatisfied with those compromises may seek redress in later electoral 
cycles or legislative sessions, but the process often reaches a point of 
equilibrium when many of those pursuing a disputed question acquiesce 
in the prevailing resolution, either because a better resolution seems 
unattainable or because more pressing issues take precedence.  When 
 
48. Beck, supra note 10, at 511–12, 528. 
49. Id. at 528. 
50. See Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference, Nov. 21, 1972, supra note 29. 
51. 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
52. See id. at 869–70; Beck, supra note 18, at 271–72. 
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courts read the Constitution to conclusively resolve a contested issue, 
however, legislators lose the ability to negotiate a different resolution in 
the lawmaking process.53  Thus, when Roe extended constitutional 
abortion rights through the second trimester of pregnancy, the Court 
deprived legislators of the power to craft political compromises on the 
central issues in the abortion controversy.  Lawmakers could still act on 
peripheral and less consequential matters,54 but the viability rule 
withdrew the most important questions in the abortion conflict from the 
legislative domain.55 
In adopting the viability rule, the Court made an enduring resolution 
of the abortion conflict difficult to attain.  The rule foreclosed the sorts 
of political compromises that have found favor in the majority of the 
world’s political systems.  In at least two significant respects, Roe’s 
viability rule offers less potential protection for fetal life than most of 
the nations of the world.56  First, the majority of nations limit the 
grounds upon which an abortion can be obtained.57  Reasons vary from 
country to country, with some very restrictive and others more 
permissive, but a significant majority of nations regulate the permissible 
grounds for an abortion.58  Roe, by contrast, has been understood to 
 
53. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not 
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).  As Jeremy Waldron has argued, “[w]hen a 
principle is entrenched in a constitutional document, the claim-right (to liberty or provision) 
that it lays down is compounded with an immunity against legislative change.”  Jeremy 
Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 27 
(1993).  The result of according the right constitutional status, therefore, is “a disabling of the 
legislature from its normal functions of revision, reform and innovation in the law.”  Id. 
54. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding 
parental notification requirement prior to minor’s abortion, subject to judicial bypass); Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding denial of funding for abortions); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (permitting proscription of abortion “subsequent to viability” 
with exceptions for the mother’s life and health). 
55. The Court indicated a few years ago that approximately 1.3 million abortions are 
performed annually in this country, with 85%–90% taking place in the first trimester and 
most of the remainder performed in the second trimester.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
134–35 (2007). 
56. See Beck, supra note 18, at 261–65. 
57. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, THE WORLD’S ABORTION LAWS 1–2 
(2009), available at http://fidakenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Worlds-Abortion-Laws-
2009.pdf; Beck, supra note 18, at 263–64. 
58. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 1–2; Beck, supra note 18, at 
264. 
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forbid such regulations prior to viability.  Second, nations that permit 
abortion without restriction as to the reason generally limit the exercise 
of abortion rights to a much shorter time period than Roe, usually 
twelve weeks or less.59  Only a small handful of countries recognize an 
unrestricted right to abortion to the point of viability or beyond.60 
Not only has the viability rule barred political compromises accepted 
in most other countries, but, more importantly, it has guaranteed a 
regime of abortion rights substantially out of alignment with public 
sentiment in this country.  In recent polling by the Gallup organization, 
respondents were asked whether “abortion should generally be legal or 
generally illegal during each of the following stages of pregnancy.”61  
When asked about the “[f]irst three months” of pregnancy, a sizable 
62% to 35% majority expressed the opinion that abortion should be 
legal.62  The numbers reversed, however, when asked about the second 
trimester.  Respondents answered by an even larger 71% to 24% 
majority that abortion should generally be illegal during the “[s]econd 
three months” of pregnancy.63  These numbers, consistent with prior 
polling on the issue, indicate that approximately seven out of ten 
Americans believe the second-trimester abortions shielded by Roe’s 
viability rule should be presumptively illegal.64  It is not just committed 
 
59. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 1–2; Beck, supra note 18, at 
264. 
60. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 1–2; Beck, supra note 18, at 
264. 
61. Lydia Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions Spark Mixed Reviews, GALLUP 
(July 25, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148631/common-state-abortion-restrictions-spark-
mixed-reviews.aspx. 
62. Id.  Three percent of respondents selected “it depends” and one percent offered “no 
opinion.”  Id. 
63. Id. (3% selected “it depends” and 2% offered “no opinion”).  During the “[l]ast 
three months” of pregnancy, 10% of respondents thought abortion should generally be legal 
and 86% thought it generally should be illegal.  Id. 
64. The chart below shows representative (percentage) results from various Gallup polls 
on the issue of whether second trimester abortions should be legal or illegal: 
 
 Legal Illegal Depends No opinion 
Apr. 2000 24 69 4 3
Jan.  2003 25 68 4 3
Jan.  2006 25 68 - 7 
July  2011 24 71 3 2
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pro-lifers who take that position.  The data suggests that a third or more 
of the public supports abortion rights in the first trimester, but wants to 
see significant legal restrictions in the second trimester, restrictions 
declared out of bounds under Roe’s viability rule.65 
By protecting abortions that many Americans find distressing, the 
viability rule has fostered pro-life mobilization.66  In the debate over 
“partial-birth abortions,” a significant popular majority responded to 
vivid descriptions of the “dilation and extraction” (D&X) or “intact 
dilation and evacuation” (intact D&E) method used in a small 
percentage of second- and third-trimester abortions.67  In opposing a 
federal ban on the procedure, the dissenting Justices in Gonzales v. 
Carhart argued that the much more common “D&E by 
dismemberment”68—employed in most second-trimester abortions—is 
“equally gruesome,” making it irrational to forbid one procedure and 
not the other.69  When even those who most strongly support 
constitutional protection for second-trimester abortions acknowledge 
that the prevailing method can be characterized as “brutal,”70 it does not 
 
See Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions Spark Mixed Reviews, supra note 61; Lydia 
Saad, Abortion Views Reviewed as Alito Vote Nears, GALLUP (Jan. 20, 2006), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/20983/abortion-views-reviewed-alito-vote-nears.aspx; Lydia Saad, 
Americans Agree with Banning “Partial-Birth Abortion,” GALLUP (Nov. 6, 2003), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/9658/americans-agree-banning-partialbirth-abortion.aspx; Lydia 
Saad, Americans Walk the Middle Road on Abortion, GALLUP (Apr. 10, 2000), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/3016/americans-walk-middle-road-abortion.aspx. 
65. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
66. See Ann MacLean Massie, So-Called “Partial-Birth Abortion” Bans: Bad Medicine? 
Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely!, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 301, 378–79 (1998) (claiming opponents of 
D&X abortions rely on “the shock value of the physical description of the procedure . . . in 
garnering support for their position”). 
67. The July 2011 Gallup poll found a 64%–31% split in favor of a law “which would 
make it illegal to perform a specific abortion procedure conducted in the last six months of 
pregnancy known as a ‘partial birth abortion,’ except in cases necessary to save the life of the 
mother.”  See Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions Spark Mixed Reviews, supra note 61; 
see also Saad, Americans Agree with Banning “Partial-Birth Abortion,” supra note 64. 
68. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 178 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using term 
“D&E by dismemberment” to refer to standard D&E procedure). 
69. Id. at 182  (“[T]he notion that either of these two equally gruesome procedures . . . is 
more akin to infanticide than the other, or that the State furthers any legitimate interest by 
banning one but not the other, is simply irrational.” (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 
914, 946–47 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring))). 
70. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Nonintact D&E could equally 
be characterized as ‘brutal,’ . . . involving as it does ‘tear[ing] [a fetus] apart’ and ‘ripp[ing] off’ 
its limbs.” (quoting majority opinion)). 
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seem surprising that the pro-life movement has persuaded many citizens 
to make abortion a voting issue.  Roe’s supporters have also been forced 
to defend difficult ground in connection with the reasons for 
terminating a pregnancy.  Under the traditional reading of the viability 
rule, parents who want a male child, rather than a female,71 or who do 
not want a child with a cleft palate,72 have just as much right to a pre-
viability abortion as a woman whose life is endangered by a pregnancy. 
Greenhouse and Siegel doubt that Roe can be accused of shutting 
down politics with respect to abortion.73  Certainly, Roe did not prevent 
people passionate about abortion from engaging in political activity 
based on their convictions.  But Roe’s viability rule did disable 
legislators from negotiating a middle ground on the issue, barring the 
compromises that have been worked out in other countries.  It 
entrenched the second-trimester abortions that a supermajority of 
Americans believe should be presumptively illegal, and channeled 
abortion-related political activity into national venues. 
Even for a Court committed to a constitutional right to abortion, 
things need not have turned out the way they did.  Imagine that instead 
of embracing the viability rule, the Supreme Court’s initial opinion 
recognizing a right to abortion had looked more like the first draft of 
Doe (a right of unspecified duration) or even the second draft of Roe (a 
right during the first trimester).74  No doubt there always would have 
been some people (this author included) who thought the Court’s 
decision inconsistent with a fair reading of the text of the Due Process 
 
71. See William Saletan, Fetal Subtraction: Sex Selection in the United States, SLATE 
(Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2188114/ (discussing statistical evidence that sex-
selection abortions occur in the United States). 
72. Health service officials in the United Kingdom were recently forced to disclose 
information on late term abortions.  The data revealed that, in 2010, seven abortions were 
carried out in England and Wales before twenty-four weeks because of cleft lip and palate.  
Court Ruling Prompts Late Abortion Data Release, BBC (July 4, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-14015096; see also Simon Caldwell, Baby that Survived 
Botched Abortion Was Rejected for Cleft Lip and Palate, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/7652889/Baby-that-
survived-botched-abortion-was-rejected-for-cleft-lip-and-palate.html. 
73. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2032 (“The backlash narrative conventionally 
identifies the Supreme Court’s decision as the cause of polarizing conflict and imagines 
backlash as arising in response to the Court repressing politics . . . .  [However,] the history 
that we examine shows how conflict over abortion escalated through the interaction of other 
institutions before the Court ruled.”). 
74. See Doe First Draft, supra note 24, at 9–11; Roe Second Draft, supra note 27, at 47. 
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Clause.  But the political aftermath of the opinion would likely have 
played out very differently.  Political conflict over abortion would have 
been fragmented into smaller, more localized clashes.  Greater 
legislative flexibility to address the abortion conflict might have 
prompted the emergence of a diversity of positions on the issue and 
would have permitted state-specific compromises acceptable to a 
majority of state citizens (subject to some constitutional minimum 
enforced by the courts).75  Instead, the Supreme Court unwisely and 
unnecessarily locked in place the existing constitutional protection for 
most second-trimester abortions, a rule out of step with public sentiment 
and inconsistent with international standards.  The result has been a 
long-running conflict over the future of the Court with major 
consequences for electoral politics. 
III. 
One can critique Roe based on its consequences for our political life 
without drawing the lesson Greenhouse and Siegel fear from the 
backlash narrative, “that adjudication inevitably causes political conflict 
and polarization and is thus to be avoided at all cost.”76  The experience 
with Roe could instead teach a lesson about the virtue of judicial 
minimalism.77  Unnecessary and expansive dictum, issued without 
briefing or argument, without a record prepared for the purpose, and 
without adequate explanation, may generate unforeseen consequences 
harmful to our political system.  How different our constitutional and 
 
75. Greenhouse and Siegel argue that pro-life activists would not have been satisfied 
with a more circumscribed right to abortion:  
 
The fervent minority who entered politics to work against abortion rights 
before and after Roe sought criminalization and were not willing to settle for 
less.  To those who believe that abortion is murder, there is no middle ground; 
it makes no difference whether a judicial or legislative decision permits 
abortion up to twelve weeks’ gestation or twenty. 
Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2074 n.163.  But controversial issues can reach 
relatively stable political resolutions even if a significant minority of the population finds the 
outcome unsatisfactory.  A less ambitious Roe opinion would have permitted legislative 
compromises that could gain majority support among citizens, even if activists on both sides 
objected. 
76. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2086. 
77. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT, at ix (1999) (“A minimalist court settles the case before it, but leaves many 
things undecided.”). 
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political history might have been if Justice Blackmun had been satisfied 
with a minimalist resolution of Roe and Doe, rather than aspiring to 
“spell out” in the Court’s first substantive opinions on abortion rights 
“just what aspects are controllable by the State and to what extent.”78 
 
78. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
